Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 11

Issue 3

Article 2

7-1-1994

Bi-Level Evidentialism and Reformed Apologetics
Michael L. Czapkay Sudduth

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Sudduth, Michael L. Czapkay (1994) "Bi-Level Evidentialism and Reformed Apologetics," Faith and
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 11 : Iss. 3 , Article 2.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199411335
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol11/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

BI-LEVEL EVIDENTIALISM AND
REFORMED APOLOGETICS
Michael L. Czapkay Sudduth

In this paper I apply William Alston's "epistemic level distinctions" to the
debate between evidentialist and anti-evidentialist approaches to Christian
apologetics in the Reformed tradition. I first clarify the nature of this debate
by showing that it rests fundamentally on a tension between the desire to
have a comprehensive Christian apologetic and the belief that the Holy Spirit
plays a special epistemic role in belief-formation, such that certain beliefs
are formed and justified by conditions unique to Christian religious experience. Secondly, I argue that even if S's belief that p is immediately justified
(through such privileged modes of belief-formation), (I) an evidentialist
requirement can be placed on the higher-level belief that P* (p is immediately
justified) and (2) apologetics can draw on the reasons which confer justification on P*, thereby providing indirect support for p.
During the last ten years, a plethora of articles has been written on what is
now called Reformed epistemology. A fairly large portion of these essays (and
books) have involved explicating, examining, and elucidating the Reformed
view on faith and reason within the context of contemporary epistemology.
A somewhat neglected area, though, has been the application of developments
in Reformed epistemology to the field of apologetics in the Reformed tradition, where both evidentialist and anti-evidentialist or presuppositionalist
approaches to apologetics have been taken by Reformed thinkers in the 20th
century. Although the debate between Reformed evidentialism and presuppositionalism includes the question of the propriety of the theistic arguments, it will
be clear in this paper that the more fundamental issues involve the nature of
apologetics and the epistemic function of the Holy Spirit in belief-formation. In
the present paper I will draw upon William Alston's notion of "epistemic level
distinctions" to clarify the nature of the Reformed apologetic debate and provide
a plausible solution to the stalemate between evidentialism and presuppositionalism. My ultimate objective here is to employ Alston's multi-level foundationalism to construct an alternative apologetic system which subsumes the
elements of positive value in both presuppositionalism and evidentialism
while avoiding their respective errors.i I call this meta-apologetic theory,
which combines immediately justified Christian beliefs with the evidentialist
demand for adequate reasons, Bi-Level Evidentialism.
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I. Evidentialism and Evidentialist Apologetics
With Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, I take it that evidentialist
apologetics began as a response to the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief
which originated out of the Enlightenment. 2 This challenge may be stated in
two propositions.
(1) A person S is rational in believing that Pt (where Pt = the proposition

God exists) only if S's belief that Pt is based upon adequate reasons.
(2) There are no adequate reasons for the belief that Pt.

Although it is possible to construe something like (1) within a coherentist
framework of rational belief, for the purpose of this paper I will take the
evidentialist challenge to be rooted in classical foundationalism. Accordingly,
although some beliefs are rational by virtue of their relation to other rational
beliefs (by being based upon beliefs which provide adequate evidential support for them), these non-basic beliefs ultimately terminate (via a based-upon
relation) in foundational beliefs (properly basic beliefs) which are rational
even though they are not based upon some other (rational) belief(s). Moreover, a belief is properly basic if and only if it is either (a) self-evident, (b)
immediately about one's experience, or (c) evident to the senses. So construed, the evidentialist challenge holds that since belief in God fulfills none
of the criteria (a)-(c) for proper basicality, theistic belief is rational only if it
can be adequately supported by some other rational beliefs, which terminate
(proximately or remotely) in beliefs which are properly basic. But there are
no such reasons that provide adequate support for theistic belief; therefore,
theistic belief is irrational.
But what does it mean to have an irrational (or rational) belief? As has been
pointed out by several writers, the concept of rationality is pluriform, and the
matter is further complicated by a disagreement amongst epistemologists on
the relationship between the concept of rationality and the closely related
notions of "justification" and "warrant." There are two senses of rationality,
though, which are important to distinguish. By "rational" one may mean
"violates no intellectual duty." This deontological view is found in Alvin
Plantinga's "Reason and Belief in God" (1983) where the evidentialist challenge is taken primarily in deontological terms, and it is argued (contra (1)
that one may believe in God without evidence and yet not be violating any
intellectual duties. 3 However, there is widespread agreement amongst
epistemologists that one may satisfy the conditions of deontological justification without satisfying other epistemic desiderata, such as truth or knowledge. 4 Now, on the one hand, this is not problematic, for it is an axiom (or
nearly so) in epistemology that a justified belief may be false (and therefore
not knowledge). But there is another sense of rationality which is stronger
than deontological rationality with respect to the cognitive aim at truth. There
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is what we can call truth-conducive rationality.s According to this concept of
rationality, a rational belief is one that would put an individual in a good
position vis-a-vis the cognitive aim at truth (where the deontological concept
fails to satisfy this condition). The constraint of truth-conducivity requires
that a person believe that p in such a way (or on such a basis) that it is at
least very likely that p is true. In the long run, this would translate into the
satisfaction of a more general epistemic desideratum: maximizing truth and
minimizing falsity in our believings. Hence, although the evidentialist challenge may be construed in terms of deontological rationality, it may also be
construed in terms of truth-conducive rationality. On the latter construal, the
theist who believes in God without having or grounding that belief in adequate propositional evidence does not necessarily violate something like an
intellectual duty, but is simply in a poor position with respect to the cognitive
aim of truth. 6 In this paper, I will be speaking in terms of "justified" belief,
where justification is truth-conducive (and the use of "rationality" should be
taken as synonomous with, or as an up-shot of, truth-conducive justification).7
In response to the evidentialist challenge which maintained that there is no
sufficient evidence for theistic belief, several philosophers and theologians
have (contra (2» sought to provide evidence for belief in God in order to
establish it as a justified belief. This project of answering the Enlightenment
challenge by adducing evidence for belief in God (where that evidence is
presented in arguments which are either deductive or inductive in form) is
evidentialist apologetics-the attempt to defend the faith by presenting positive arguments in favor of belief in God. However, if we view the development of evidentialist apologetics as a response to the Enlightenment challenge
to theistic belief, then there are two different epistemic principles upon which
evidentialist apologetics can proceed.
Evidentialist apologetics would follow from (1) if and only if (1) was
conjoined with
(3) S believes that there is adequate evidence for theistic belief.

An apologist, then, might accept the epistemological thesis of the Enlightenment that theistic belief is justified only if it is based upon adequate reasons, but also hold that there is sufficient evidence for theistic belief.
Therefore, he would proceed on the assumption that belief in God without
sufficient evidence is always irrational. We can call this Strong Evidentialism (hereafter, E s ), since it maintains that adequate reasons are necessary for
justified belief in God. Es-based apologetics accepts (1), but then, on the basis
of (3), proceeds to argue that theistic belief can be supported by evidence,
and that such evidence is sufficient and hence shows theistic belief to be
rational. But a commitment to evidentialist apologetics need not involve an
acceptance of (1). It could follow from (3) alone. An apologist might attempt

382

Faith and Philosophy

to supply theistic evidences simply because he believes that they do in fact
exist (and are necessary for apologetics), not because he accepts the Enlightenment principle that theistic belief requires such evidence in order to be
rational. So evidentialist apologetics can be based upon the epistemological
thesis that evidence is a sufficient condition for rational belief. In other terms,
an apologist might believe that belief in God can be rational (in some sense)
without evidence, but nevertheless there is evidence for God's existence
which should be adduced in apologetics. One may endorse and use theistic
proofs or arguments in apologetics, but not hold that such evidences are
necessary for a person to have a rational belief in God. We can caB this
version of evidential ism Modest Evidentialism (hereafter Em) and its apologetic application Em-based apologetics.

II. Reformed Apologetics
The history of Reformed theology has displayed a certain degree of ambivalence over the role of evidences in the justification of theistic belief. This
ambivalence is most perspicuous in late 19th- and 20th-century Reformed
apologetics,S where two schools of thought, Reformed evidentialism and
presuppositonalism, have taken two quite distinct approaches to Christian
apologetics. Presuppositionalism, based upon the work of the 19th-century
Amsterdam theologian and philosopher Abraham Kuyper, has as its central
characteristics the rejection of arguments for the existence of God and an
emphasis upon taking belief in the God of Scripture as the starting point for
every dimension of human life. Presuppositionalists (such as Herman Bavinck, Cornelius Van Til, and Gordon Clark) have argued that belief in both
God and Scripture is an epistemically appropriate starting-point for the believer. Kuyper and Clark both press the point that every system of thought
rests upon presuppositions, and every act of demonstration must terminate in
first principles. Since ultimate premises are appropriately argued/rom, never
to, there is no need to prove the existence of God or that Scripture is His
Word. Moreover, since these beliefs are produced by the inward work of the
Holy Spirit in regeneration, it is futile to adduce arguments for theistic or
Christian belief in apologetics. Reformed evidentialists (such as Jonathan
Edwards, Charles Hodge, and B.B Warfield), on the other hand, have generally not questioned the plausibility of taking theistic belief as a first principle,
but they have questioned the inference from this that such principles should
never be argued for. They have recognized that intuitive truths can also be
discursively established, and that in apologetics one must reason back to
theological first principles, not from them (as is appropriate in theology).
Therefore, arguments for the existence of God and other Christian doctrines
may be (and must be) used in apologetics.
As a starting point, I suggest that the debate between these two apologetic
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schools be considered in the light of the epistemological distinction drawn
above between Es and Em. Both presuppositionalism and Reformed evidentialism have at least one thing in common-both would deny (1). As Plantinga
has argued, a basic principle of the Reformed tradition is the proper basicality
or immediate justification of theistic belief (where a belief is justified by
virtue of something other than some relation that belief has to some other
justified beliefs). Hence the Reformed theologian would be committed in
principle to rejecting deontological and truth-conducive versions of Es. Both
presuppositionalists and Reformed evidentialists agree that, insofar as the
believer is concerned, theistic belief can be immediately justified. 9 The point
at issue concerns the possibility of a mediately justified theistic belief and its
place in apologetics, for if theistic belief can be mediately justified, then the
reasons which confer such justification can be presented in apologetics.
If we concentrate solely on the Reformed tradition's commitment to the
immediate justification of theistic belief (a theme heavily emphasized in the
presuppositionalist's camp), it certainly seems that Em is compatible with
both Reformed evidentialism and presuppositionalism. If the Reformed position is committed to the epistemological thesis that belief in God can be
justified for some person S without S basing that belief upon adequate reasons, it does not follow that there are no adequate reasons for such a belief,
reasons which could be adduced in apologetics or which could even form a
sufficient basis for a rational belief in God for someone. Put more technically,
if S's belief in God can be immediately justified, why should this necessarily
rule out the possibility of that very belief also being susceptible to a mediate
justification? After all, one sufficient condition does not logically rule out
the possibility of another.
One may take an analogy here from the belief "It is raining outside." One
may form this belief on the basis of a particular sensory experience, say by
just looking out the window. In such an instance the person would be appeared
to rainly, and the belief that it is raining outside would be immediately
justified on the grounds of sensory experience (assuming, of course, that the
sensory experience can function as an adequate ground). Take another situation though. A person may be locked in a room without windows, but nevertheless has access to a certain body of auditory evidence. This person cannot
see the rain falling down, nor can he run outside and feel the raindrops falling
on his head. But he hears a series of rolls of thunder, a prolonged period of
pitter-patter on the roof, and then someone walks in with a raincoat and
umbrella soaked with water. We might add to this a certain set of background
beliefs about what generally accompanies thunder and so on. The person concludes, based upon these evidences, that it is (or has just been) raining outside.
The possibility that this was a cruel experiment conducted by an epistemologist
(complete with sound effects and an actor with a raincoat just sprayed down
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with a garden hose) notwithstanding, it is reasonable to see how one might
conclude with a very high degree of probability that it is raining outside. The
belief in question, then, can either be immediately justified on the grounds
of sensory perceptual experience or mediately justified on the grounds of
adequate reasons. Of course, such a justification would only be prima facie,
since it would be subject to being overridden by sufficient reasons to the
contrary. But until then, the belief in question is prima facie justified.
Similarly, theistic belief might be a candidate for immediate justification
(e.g., by being based upon the grounds of religious experience) and also find
sufficient conditions for justification in other justified beliefs. An apologetic
method based upon a modest evidentialism of this sort would be prima facie
compatible with Reformed theology since it allows for an immediately justified belief in God. But, since it equally allows for a mediately justified
theistic belief, it would be able to make use of the reasons which produce
such ajustification. Hence, by adducing arguments which contain the relevant
evidences, apologetics would be devoted to providing reasons for theistic
belief, though this would in no way reflect the grounds upon which the
Christian ought to believe. The only requirement would be that theistic belief
be subject to both an immediate and mediate justification, and-as we have
just seen-this is most plausible on epistemological grounds. Moreover, it is
supported historically by the endorsement of theistic arguments by theologians in the Reformed tradition. \0 The Old School Calvinist William Shedd,
though emphasizing the fact that belief in the existence of God is an intuitive
first principle (and as such is given immediately to human consciousness),
says that "certain syllogistic arguments have been constructed ... [which] (1)
assist the development of the idea of God, and contain a scientific analysis
of man's natural consciousness of the deity... [and] (2) reply to the counterarguments of materialism and atheism."!! Similarly, Charles Hodge maintained that belief in God is among those "certain truths which the mind
perceives to be true immediately, without proof or testimony," but he was
critical of those theologians and philosophers who inferred from this that the
existence of God could not be proved. That there is "an extra-mundane and
eternal being," and that "he is a personal Being, self-conscious, intelligent,
and moral. .. may lie inclosed in primary intuition, but it needs to be brought
out and established."12 The Calvinistic Baptist Augustus Strong wrote: "Although the knowledge of God's existence is intuitive, it may be explicated
and confirmed by arguments drawn from the actual universe and from the
abstract ideas of the human mind."13

III. The Dilemma of Presuppositionalist Apologetics
In the Reformed tradition, however, there seems to be a problem, and the
problem arises in the presuppositionalist camp. The preceding conclusion
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implies that belief in God can be formed on some basis other than the inner
testimony of the Holy Spirit, that there are reasons (to which the unregenerate
person has access) which entail (or render probable) the existence of God.
Presuppositionalists, though, have argued that it is the testimonium Spiritus
Sancti that enables the Christian to see immediately (without any reasons)
the truth of God's existence and Scripture as a revelation from Him. Now
admittedly this is complicated by a certain degree of vacillation among presuppositionalists as to whether it is the belief that God exists that is produced
by the Spirit or whether it is the certainty that He exists which is produced
by the Spirit. Calvin makes several statements to the effect that it is the
"certainty which piety requires" and "firm faith in Scripture" which is produced by the Spirit and cannot be established by argumentation, and he
suggests the same for belief in God. 14 Abraham Kuyper, the father of presuppositional ism, understood the act of faith to be "that function of the soul...by
which it obtains certainty directly and immediately, without the aid of discursive demonstration."ls Again, he speaks of faith in its "formal sense" as
"a firm conviction," which "is not the outcome of observation or demonstration."16 Herman Bavinck, after stating that we are deeply convinced of the
external world, the self, and moral law without proofs or argumentation, and
that belief in God is of a similar class, says, "The so-called proofs may convey
greater clearness, [but] they are by no means the final grounds of our most
certain conviction that God exists. This certainty is established only by
faith."17 But, if to believe that p is to take it that p is more probable than
not-p (or some alternative q),18 then "certainty" would not be a necessary
component to "belief," and one should appropriately distinguish "belief that
God exists" from "faith in God," where "faith" is taken to entail "certainty."
Otherwise one is just confusing terms. And it does seem that there are many
cases of religious belief which do not entail "certainty." The references above
suggest that we should distinguish belief that God exists from a "certain"
conviction that he exists. So perhaps the Spirit produces the element of
"certainty" in religious belief. And even if one maintains that the Spirit
produces both the belief and the certainty, this still leaves open the possibility
that something else (reasons) can produce the belief, even if one is not certain
about p. In this way, an argument which showed that God's existence was
more probable than not might lead to belief, though not faith.
The theologian in the Kuyperian tradition might respond, "But after all it
is not belief in the true God." And that will inevitably be the presuppositionalist's response. The saying of Pascal is well known: "God of Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob, not of the philosophers and scholars." Calvin himself emphasized
that, though the knowledge of God is innate, we lack "the natural ability to
mount up unto the pure and clear knowledge of God"19 and that "Scripture,
gathering up the otherwise confused knowledge of God in our minds ... clearly
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shows us the true God,"20 not merely as the Creator but as the Redeemer.
Similar sentiments can be found in the writings of Kuyper, Bavinck, Van Til,
and Clark. I rather suspect, then, that the definition of God as "a person
without a body who is eternal, is perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly good, and the creator of all things"21 would not satisfy the presuppositionalist, since this definition expresses a fundamental conception of
Deity common to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. That there are strong
arguments for the existence of a God defined in these terms, which might
produce belief that such a God exists, would not impress the presuppositionalist. Although the Reformed theologian (including the presuppositionalist)
would agree that a general theistic belief can be formed on some basis other
than the inward work of the Spirit, he would also emphasize that belief in
the God of Scripture (Christian theism in particular) requires special revelation, and belief in that revelation may not be possible without the illumination
of the Spirit.
This has brought us to what is perhaps the crux of the problem in presuppositionalist apologetics-the domain of the class of beliefs targeted in the
apologetic task and the epistemic function of the Holy Spirit in belief formation relative to these beliefs. Up to this point we have focused on theistic
belief (Pt) as the domain of apologetics, rather than the broader category of
Christian belief (Pc, where Pc entails Pt-though obviously not the converse). Presuppositionalists, though, have insisted that Christian apologetics
must be concerned with more than the attempt to argue for a minimal theism.
The apologetic task must be concerned with Pc-beliefs.22 The central issues
of the philosophy of religion have been questions concerning the nature of
God, the meaningfulness of religious language, and the rationality of belief
in God. Only recently has the philosophy of religion taken up questions
relating to the more specific religious claims, but this is still very much
uncharted territory.23 In the philosophy of religion general religious claims
and beliefs have been central, not the more specifically Christian claims. So,
even if theistic belief could be formed on some basis other than the testimony
of the Holy Spirit, we would still be left with the question as to whether belief
in the several other central, and not so central, Christian doctrines could be
so formed. I think that the Reformed theologian is committed to believing
that among Pc-beliefs there are at least some Christian propositions belief in
which requires the inner testimony of the Spirit.24 Let us call this special
subset of Pc-beliefs, privileged epistemic state beliefs (PES-beliefs) [Not to
be confused with the notion of privileged access to one's own mental states].
PES-beliefs would be Pc-beliefs that require for their formation and justification epistemic conditions unique to the Christian. This could be cast in
terms of belief formation on the grounds of a distinctly Christian religious
experience and doxastic practice (as developed recently by William Alston
in Perceiving God) or in terms of the proper functioning of special belief-
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forming mechanisms (subject to the various additional Plantingian "warrant"
constraints).25 The essential point is that the justifiers of such beliefs would
at least include grounds or epistemic conditions unique to the mental life of
the person indwelt by the Holy Spirit.26
I would suggest that it is this conclusion that brings the project of Reformed
apologetics to a serious impasse. Apologetics has as its objective showing
that Christian beliefs or the Christian system of belief possesses some positive
epistemic status. The concept of showing, though, clearly entails discursive
or mediate justification. To show that p I must adduce other beliefs in support
of p. These other beliefs must be justified and such that they constitute
adequate reasons for p. Moreover, since showing is an audience-relative
concept, the reasons must be acceptable to the audience. Now, if we restrict
ourselves to theistic belief (as Reformed evidentialists have tended to do),
the reasons are available. But what if we extend the set of beliefs targeted in
apologetics to PES-beliefs, the formation of which require epistemic conditions to which only the Christian has access? And what if there is no good
argument from Pt to PES-beliefs? This is like having an intuitive first principle which can only be seen intuitively by a certain class of people and which
refuses (purely) discursive support in order to be shown to others. How, then,
can the Reformed apologist defend the rationality of a class of beliefs which
are formed on the basis of a Christian religious experience and subject only
to an immediate justification? More generally, how can beliefs that is formed
and justified by privileged modes (immediate or mediate) of belief formation
be shown to possess an epistemic status which they have by virtue of conditions which (at least) include those privileged epistemic conditions? This is
the dilemma of presuppositionalist apologetics.

IV. Epistemic Level Distinctions and Bi-Level Evidentialism
Faced with the above dilemma, presuppositionalists have turned to negative
apologetics-answering objections made against Christianity. This has
largely amounted to showing that such and such Christian belief is rational
because coherent, or that some set of Christian doctrines is rational because
self-consistent. After all, even if one cannot show that some set of propositions is true, one can show that they are self-consistent. Even if one cannot
show that the Christian God exists, certainly one can show that it is a coherent
belief. Unfortunately, a system may be entirely self-consistent, and yet possesses more false propositions than true ones, even all false propositions.
Coherence is not a truth-conducive mode of justification. Taken by itself, it
is a poor epistemological basis on which to launch a Christian apologetic.
There is, however, another epistemological move that can be made along
foundationalist lines, which would provide a solid basis for a form of positive
apologetics.
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The problem with presuppositionalism in apologetics is really a problem
with an aspect of foundationalism in epistemology. Correctly recognizing that
all mediate justification must terminate with beliefs which are immediately
justified, presuppositionalists have argued that if that is where the justification stops, the epistemological buck stops there. To avoid an infinite regress
of demonstrations, one must terminate justification in first principles or basic
beliefs. Unfortunately, this fundamental reason for adopting foundationalism
is also the major reason why some have avoided it. It seems to end up in
arbitrary dogmatism, for-it is argued-the foundationalist is committed to
accepting beliefs for no reason whatsoever. In fact, presuppositionalists in
Reformed apologetics have often come across this way. They disavow any
attempt to give reasons for their first principles, for the foundations. They
seem to be committed to adopting beliefs in the absence of all evidence.
I believe that the way of escape here is to introduce the notion of "epistemic
level distinctions," a theme which figures prominently in the epistemology
of William Alston. 27 Given any putative belief that p, we may distinguish
between the belief that p and various higher-level doxastic correlates of p,
the candidates for which would include S's belief that: (a) p is a rational
belief, (b) p is immediately justified, (c) p was formed in a reliable manner,
or (d) p is based upon adequate grounds. Among other things, this allows us
to distinguish between a belief that p and a higher-level belief about the
epistemic status of p (call the higher level belief "the belief that P*"). This
in turn makes possible the assessment of any belief (even an immediately
justified belief) in terms of reasons, for where a belief that p is immediately
justified, it is possible (in principle) to find reasons for the higher-level belief
that p is immediately justified. So even if the belief that p is immediately
justified, the belief that p* (p is immediately justified) can be mediately
justified. Therefore, if a lower-level belief that p can only be immediately
justified, it does not follow that p cannot be assessed in terms of reasons.
Even if one is restricted to immediate justification on the lower level for the
belief that p, one may adduce reasons at the higher level for the belief that
P*. We can call these reasons meta-reasons, since they are reasons for regarding the belief that p as immediately justified. These reasons would be
something like p possesses some property Q and possessing Q renders p
justified; that is to say, meta-reasons concern whether there is a valid
epistemic principle and whether the belief in question (by virtue of possessing
the appropriate justification-making property) falls under that principle. Hence,
the absence of reasons at the lower-level can be compensated for by reasons
which are adduced at the higher level. The belief that p is immediately justified,
while the correlative epistemic belief of p (P*) is mediately justified.
In "Two Types of Foundationalism," William Alston explains this level
distinction in the following terms:
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Though the simple foundationalist requires some immediately justified beliefs in order to terminate the regress of justification, his position permits
him to recognize that all epistemic beliefs require mediate justification.
Therefore, for any belief that one is immediately justified in believing, one
may find adequate reasons for accepting the proposition that one is so justified. The curse (of dogmatism) is taken off immediate justification at the
lower level, just by virtue of the fact that propositions at the higher level are
acceptable only on the basis of reasons. A foundational belief, b, is immediately justified just because some valid epistemic principle lays down conditions for its being justified which do not include the believer having certain
other justified beliefs. But the believer will be justified in believing that he
is immediately justified in holding b only if he has reasons for regarding that
principle as valid and regarding b as falling under that principle. And if he
does have such reasons, he certainly cannot be accused of arbitrariness or
dogmatism in accepting b. 28

Hence, we may formulate the principle of the higher-level evidentialist
option:
(4) Given any person S, if S's belief that p is immediately justified, then S's
belief that P* (p is immediately justified) may be mediately justified.

Applied to our present inquiry two general consequences follow from this
multi-level epistemology. The apparatus of epistemic level distinctions allows
us to distinguish between the belief that Pt (God exists) and the belief that
Pt* (Pt is justified). Even if S's belief that Pt is immediately justified, it is
possible to ascend a level and raise the question regarding the epistemic status
of the belief that God exists, to consider (reasons for) the higher-level proposition S's belief that Pt is immediately justified. This move will become all
the more important if we consider the problematic PES-beliefs discussed
above. There we stipulated that PES-beliefs are beliefs formed under
epistemic conditions unique to the Christian. Our primary targets were basic
or immediate PES-beliefs (e.g., beliefs based upon Christian religious experience), the necessary justificatory conditions of which include (non-doxastic) grounds to which only the person indwelt by the Holy Spirit has cognitive
access, the up-shot of which is that such PES-beliefs are subject only to an
immediate justification. Clearly, though, if we distinguish between PES-beliefs and PES* -beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the epistemic status of PES-beliefs),
then even if the justificatory conditions (whether immediate or mediate) of
PES-beliefs are in some way privileged (such that only the Christian has
access to them), the justificatory conditions of the higher-level epistemic
correlates of PES-beliefs need not be privileged in that way. So even if a
PES-belief is restricted to a form of justification which is privileged and
immediate, the PES-belief can still be assessed in terms of reasons which are
accessible to the non-Christian, for she may consider the reasons for the
PES-belief's higher-level correlate PES*. Even where S's PES-belief is
solely immediately justified, the correlative higher-level belief that S's PES-
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belief is (solely) immediately justified may be mediately justified by being
based upon accessible adequate reasons. And even where the target PES-belief is formed and justified by a privileged mediate mode of belief formation
(such that the doxastic grounds for the PES-belief are only seen by the
Christian) one can always raise the higher-level question and seek accessible
reasons for the belief that S's PES-belief is mediately justified. Now I emphasize the accessibility element because the types of reasons or beliefs that are
envisaged here as the grounds for PES*-beliefs are-as already pointed outbeliefs as to what principles of epistemic justification are valid and whether
the target PES-belief can be validly subsumed under any of these principles.
The formation and justification of such beliefs hardly seems a matter to be
restricted to the cognitive life of the Christian.
Secondly, this distinction between various epistemic levels also allows us
to incorporate a strong version of evidential ism. The distinction between
epistemic levels entails that there are actually (at least) two distinct levels on
which the evidentialist requirement for reasons may operate. There is a lowerlevel evidentialist requirement which requires for the justification of any
putative belief that p that p be based upon adequate reasons, and there is a
higher-level evidentialist requirement which requires adequate reasons for
the justification of any higher-level correlate of a putative belief that p. Alston
argues that if an epistemic belief is justified, it is mediately justified. Higherlevel beliefs about the epistemic status of lower-level correlates are evaluative in nature, but all such evaluation involves supervenient properties, and
the application of such properties will invariably be based upon more fundamental properties. If S is immediately justified in some belief that p this is
because there is a valid epistemic principle which lays down conditions for
the belief's being justified which do not include the possession of other
beliefs. If S is to be justified in the belief that P* (S's belief that p is
immediately justified), then S must have reasons for regarding such a principle as valid and for regarding p as appropriately falling under the principle.
In other terms, S is justified in believing that S's belief that p is immediately
justified (if and) only if S is justified in believing that p possesses some
property Q (a so-called "warrant increasing property") and that any belief
that possesses Q is immediately justified. 29
As I have argued, Es (strong evidentialism) is incompatible with Reformed
theology since it rules out immediately justified theistic beliefs, and Em
(modest evidentialism) is compatible with Reformed thought by virtue of
leaving room for basic beliefs. However, now that we have introduced higherlevel beliefs, we can modify our previous conclusion. All that was established
earlier was that, since-for the Reformed theologian-theistic belief (and
some Pc-beliefs) are immediately justified, basing such beliefs upon adequate
evidence cannot be a necessary condition for their justification. Conse-
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quently, Es was rejected with respect to lower-level beliefs. The situation is
different at the higher level. Here we may maintain that higher-level beliefs
always require adequate reasons for their justification. What we have found
in the Reformed tradition is an emphasis upon immediately justified beliefs
at the lower-level. From this follows only the rejection oflower-Ievel Es. This
leaves open the possibility of advocating Es on the higher level with respect
to all epistemic beliefs.30 We may, therefore, lay down the principle of the
higher-level evidentialist requirement:
(5) Given any belief that p, p's correlative higher-level epistemic belief that
P* is justified only ifP* is based upon adequate reasons. 31

The preceding epistemology, then, gives us the following statement on the
justification of Christian beliefs, what I call Bi-Level Evidentialism (which
conjoins both lower-level Em and higher-level Es).32
(6) Given any person S, if S's belief that Pc (where Pc = any Christian
belief) is either (a) immediately justified, (b) mediately justified, or (c)
both [(a) and (b»), and if p is either (a) or (b) then the correlative
epistemic belief that Pc* is justified only if Pc* is based upon adequate
reasons.

The foregoing epistemology of religious belief allows for a far richer
framework for Christian apologetics than has been previously taken up by
Reformed apologists, and one which goes considerable distance toward overcoming the stalemate between the Reformed evidentialists and presuppositionalists. It follows from the argument of the previous section that the
activity of justifying Christian belief(s) can take place on anyone of many
epistemic levels. The dominant tradition in Christian apologetics has been
what we might call lower-level positive apologetics-the attempt to justify
various religious beliefs and/or theological propositions (which are
nonepistemic) by an appeal to other nonepistemic beliefs. I will call this the
L-justifying of beliefs ("L" referring to the "lower-level" from which the
support is drawn). Alternatively, Bi-Level Evidentialism opens up the prospects for higher-level positive apologetics. Here some putative Christian
belief that Pc is supported by the activity of justifying the correlative higherlevel belief that Pc*, what we can call the method of H-justifying. So, for
example, where S's belief that Pc is immediately justified, one may adduce
the appropriate reasons for regarding (the higher-level proposition) Pc is
immediately justified as justified. This method extends the scope of apologetics to cover a wide range of Christian beliefs which hitherto could not (or
at least not readily) be assessed in terms of reasons.
The relevance of H-justifying to apologetics is determined by the apologetic relevance of meta-reasons, and apologetic relevance is conditioned by
"epistemic" and/or "alethic" relevance, for the apologist is engaged in the
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two-fold objective of trying to establish the rationality and truth of Christian
belief(s). Higher-level beliefs that are about the epistemic status of their
lower-level correlates are directly epistemically relevant and hence provide
a kind of direct support for the belief's epistemic status. But if the epistemic
status is truth-conducive (as our concept of justification has been), then a
belief's epistemic status is indirectly relevant to its alethic status, and therefore establishing the former provides indirect support for the latter. In other
terms, although we begin by targeting an epistemic belief by considering
reasons for Pt* (or, more broadly, any Christian belief Pc*), this procedure
ends up providing reasons for Pt (or PC).33 In this way we can call H-justifying a mode of indirect support for Pt (or Pc), for the activity of justifying
the lower-level belief that Pt (or Pc) is mediated by the activity of justifying
the higher-level belief that Pt* (or PC*).34

V. Conclusion
At the beginning of the paper we saw that the belief that there is adequate
evidence for the existence of God is sufficient for launching the project of
evidentialist apologetic (whether or not one also buys into the evidentialist
principle that the rationality of theistic belief requires propositional support).
Reasons may be essential to justifying theistic belief (via apologetics), even
if not necessary for a person's being epistemically justified in believing in
God. What evidentialist apologetics depends upon, of course, is the possibility of a mediate justification of the target belief and the ability to adduce
those reasons. In the light of this, I suggested that the difficulty in Reformed
apologetics was not fundamentally a disagreement about the possibility of a
mediately justified theistic belief (as this is quite compatible with an immediately justified theistic belief), but rather the dilemma of Reformed apologetics is generated by (1) the desire to have a more comprehensive Christian
apologetic and (2) the belief that the Holy Spirit has a special epistemic
function in the production of certain Christian beliefs, leading to privileged
epistemic state beliefs.
Drawing upon William Alston's multi-level foundationalism I have argued
two points. First an epistemological claim: even where a putative belief that
Pc is immediately justified, it is possible (in principle) to find reasons for
regarding the belief as immediately justified. Moreover, an evidentialist requirement for being justified in all such higher-level beliefs would be compatible with the immediate justification of beliefs at the lower level.
Secondly, I applied this bi-level scheme to Reformed apologetics, specifically
to the debate between evidentialist and presuppositionalist schools. The
higher-level evidentialist option makes possible a more comprehensive Christian apologetic, for we may adduce reasons for Pc by justifying Pc's higherlevel epistemic correlate Pc*, a most important move where the target beliefs
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are PES-beliefs, beliefs formed on the grounds of religious experience or
some other privileged epistemic condition(s). Bi-Level Evidentialism allows
the Reformed thinker to enter into the task of "giving a reason for the hope
that is within him," even when that hope is a product of, what John Calvin
called, the testimonium Spiritus Sancti. 35
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